In this argument I have adapted a letter for this assignment that I actually sent out to raise money for cancer research. I am trying to elicit feelings of sadness and desperation through Mikey's story, and feelings of hopefulness and a sense of motivation to donate. The main claim if the letter is to donate to Texas 4000, but a strong secondary claim here is to be aware that cancer is a huge problem and one that can be solved. The link is below and if you are so inclined, visit www.texas4000.org to find out more.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DmUJce4K078invgzWxCR-1o1PX-cFb4NACiv2HtASEY/edit?pli=1&hl=en&authkey=CNSd6k0#
Thursday, March 3, 2011
Tuesday, March 1, 2011
Damasio ch 1-4
Upon getting over the shock my mirror neurons gave me after reading about Phineas Gage, I began to try and wade through the neurological terminology Damasio uses to try and find a rhetorical use for the tale he is telling (taking "rhetoric" in a more narrow sense, not how Kennedy would define it). Using the stories of Gage and Elliot, Damasio was able to illustrate, however grotesquely, that certain parts of the brain govern certain aspects of life, be it reason, personality, etc, and maybe more importantly, that said reasons are not perfectly defined. It is not the neuroscience that interests me though.
I am fine with the fact that certain emotions exist on certain levels (ch 7), but thinking back to the beginning chapters it can be observed that the brain is not the product of some higher assembly line, rather it is tailored to the specific person through learned practice. This is knowing your audience on a whole new level.
In Damasio's Aside on Phrenology, he said that "[t]he mind results from the operation of each of the separate components, and from the concerted operation of the multiple systems constituted by those separate components" (ch1). So in essence our mind is an orchestra, and our ideas and speech that spew forth is the symphony composed therein. My question is, assuming an understanding of the basic paradigm of brain function, can a person appeal just to the string section, then to the horns, and so on until the entire consciousness is playing the rhetor's song? Second question: did Leo just make a movie about that?
Maybe a better question is: Should, or, is it effective to, target individual emotions related to the ideal state on the overall continuum you want your audience to be at (say resentment for anger), to build to the target emotion gradually?
I am fine with the fact that certain emotions exist on certain levels (ch 7), but thinking back to the beginning chapters it can be observed that the brain is not the product of some higher assembly line, rather it is tailored to the specific person through learned practice. This is knowing your audience on a whole new level.
In Damasio's Aside on Phrenology, he said that "[t]he mind results from the operation of each of the separate components, and from the concerted operation of the multiple systems constituted by those separate components" (ch1). So in essence our mind is an orchestra, and our ideas and speech that spew forth is the symphony composed therein. My question is, assuming an understanding of the basic paradigm of brain function, can a person appeal just to the string section, then to the horns, and so on until the entire consciousness is playing the rhetor's song? Second question: did Leo just make a movie about that?
Maybe a better question is: Should, or, is it effective to, target individual emotions related to the ideal state on the overall continuum you want your audience to be at (say resentment for anger), to build to the target emotion gradually?
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Thinking about how Smith and Hyde Rethought Emotion
The Smith and Hyde article presented some interesting thoughts and shed a different light on the Aristotle readings. Whereas most of our previous discussions had centered around Aristotle's somewhat problematic exploration of opposites, this article provides a useful application of those polarities. Before I had viewed Aristotle's exploration of the emotions as primarily philosophical, useful in critically thinking about the particular emotions we can evoke in an audience and that audience themselves. Cast in the light of this article however, it seems much more clear and useful.
The individual plays an interesting part in this discussion. They argue for an individual who is innately affected by the masses, since "even being alone presupposes a being-with-others, for an individual can be alone only because the other is not present with him/her" (448). That can be all well and good, but it seems to be cyclical: I am alone because I am not with other people, but it takes other people for me to know I am alone. Maybe that is not cyclical, but it seems problematic to me.
Abandoning that train of thought entirely, I gleaned what seemed to be a procedure for moving the masses. (I think they actually stated it explicitly somewhere, but I could not find it again.) They discussed three things: 1) the public, 2) the individual, and 3) Aristotle's pathe (449). Plato espoused that the argument that worked on the individual would also work on the public, but maybe not the other way around, since the individual is more critical than the crowd since he can ask questions to the speaker. So if a person has an argument that will work on an individual, than it will be exponentially more effective on the crowd, since it will resonate with each individual in the crowd. That being said, if the speaker/writer makes use of Aristotle's pathe/concept of enargia to take the crowd from their mixed emotional state and brings them to the brink of fanaticism (but not into a state of extremity), then that it is the most effective argument.
...Maybe?
The individual plays an interesting part in this discussion. They argue for an individual who is innately affected by the masses, since "even being alone presupposes a being-with-others, for an individual can be alone only because the other is not present with him/her" (448). That can be all well and good, but it seems to be cyclical: I am alone because I am not with other people, but it takes other people for me to know I am alone. Maybe that is not cyclical, but it seems problematic to me.
Abandoning that train of thought entirely, I gleaned what seemed to be a procedure for moving the masses. (I think they actually stated it explicitly somewhere, but I could not find it again.) They discussed three things: 1) the public, 2) the individual, and 3) Aristotle's pathe (449). Plato espoused that the argument that worked on the individual would also work on the public, but maybe not the other way around, since the individual is more critical than the crowd since he can ask questions to the speaker. So if a person has an argument that will work on an individual, than it will be exponentially more effective on the crowd, since it will resonate with each individual in the crowd. That being said, if the speaker/writer makes use of Aristotle's pathe/concept of enargia to take the crowd from their mixed emotional state and brings them to the brink of fanaticism (but not into a state of extremity), then that it is the most effective argument.
...Maybe?
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Visual Analysis – “Remember Pearl Harbor”
For those patriotic citizens, this poster would have evoked many different motivations. The “Remember Pearl Harbor” tag line at the top brings out sadness and pain like salt on an open wound for what happened in Hawaii. The distorted figure in the Nazi uniform waving the alms of peace in the face of a national symbol provokes anger at the Japanese for lying, and vengeful rage to get back at them for what they did. That image also, coupled with the swastika on the knife held in the Japanese arm acts as a unification device building a common enemy in the minds of Americans – an important step in war rhetoric. A crucial part of establishing the common enemy is to dehumanize the outgroup, which is done by having the long nails on the hand of the knife and the distorted figure that is supposed to be a Japanese soldier. That unification device makes American's feel confidant, that this enemy can defeated because we (the ingroup) are inherently better than they are. The arm in the background is a very powerful part of this image, evoking fear and an overhanging foreboding – essentially saying that the enemy, both Japanese and Nazi, are poised and ready to hit the US in a devastating way again while we (the Statue of Liberty), stand idly by, unaware. The Statue of Liberty is not even looking at the Japanese man, adding to the feeling of aloofness (an aloofness you can solve by buying war bonds). By having the date of the Pearl Harbor attack written on the blade of the knife, it is bringing up the feelings people had right after the attack, and saying that another attack can be prevented if you buy war bonds. Given the position of the knife to America’s back, it is portraying another attack as imminent, while drawing on the public’s memory of the horror that came because of it to elicit the dread of it happening again. “What can you do to ensure that it doesn’t? Buy war bonds.”
The Statue of Liberty is an interesting part of this image, which really ties into the behavior the image sparks. It was targeted at a patriotic American audience, yet a national symbol for liberty and freedom – some of the reasons we were fighting – is presented as a helpless figure, subject to the Nazis and the Japanese. It makes a person want to literally reach out and grab the arm holding the knife and pull it back to save liberty. That feeling translates into doing whatever they could to help the vulnerable American nation. Luckily for them, the answer of how to save the Statue of Liberty, America, and the ideas of freedom and liberty is plainly written at the bottom – “Buy War Bonds”.
As far as belief, it is telling the viewer that America is under immediate danger, even if someone is telling you peace is near. The sense of impending doom is strengthened by the involvement of Pearl Harbor, and because it was such a powerful event in American society, it becomes just as strong in American propaganda. On that day we went from a country at peace (despite being on the brink of war) violently into the throes of war, and that is the sentiment captured and expressed here by the combination of the symbols of the Japanese figure (feigned peace) and the poised knife (imminent destruction). The main thing it wants you to believe is that Pearl Harbor can happen again, and more importantly, if you do not buy war bonds, it will happen again.
I don’t believe this image falls into the clean cut “types” that Aristotle outlines. It sure plays on the quick to anger, but since the common trait to its targeted audience is patriotism, a trait not limited to the young, old, or the 49 year-olds, I think it might transcend age (but that could be my own idealistic bias).
In the 1940s, the young had just emerged from the depression, and because of that I believe them to be more frugal than Aristotle allows. Aristotle says “[t]heir lives are mainly spent not in memory but in expectation, for expectation refers to the future, memory to the past” (bkIIch12). This can fit the picture in an interesting way, since the allusion to Pearl Harbor draws in the brief past, and the position of the knife adds a notion of ever-approaching destruction – something the youthful would be concerned about. The elderly on the other hand, the opposite of the Aristotelian youth, live mainly in the past rather than the future, but if either age bracket had a deep tie to patriotism then it would be equally effective, never mind if the person was looking to the past of future (bkIIch13).
The elderly, as Aristotle describes them, have a tight coin purse and are suspicious, but keen to promote self-preservation (bkIIch13). “Their fits of anger are sudden but feeble”, so in a weak moment they might remember the attack and buy a war bond (bkIIch13). It doesn’t fit there, since the attack, which is still painful today, would have been at the forefront of the majority of patriotic peoples mind. “They live by memory rather than hope” (bkIIch13). The Aristotelian elderly do not respond to hope, so they doesn’t fit the picture either since by nature of the ongoing war and the perched knife, the hope for peace and a resolution of the conflict is the point of the propaganda. The self-preservation aspect is interesting, since it has some element of hope ingrained in it innately, but that seems almost contradictory. Due to the complex argument presented by the picture, the overarching Aristotelian types of "young" and "old" do not fit, but more the more narrow elderly interested in self-preservation would fit along with the young who refer to the future (but have a feeling for the past).
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
Aristotle's Rhetoric Book II, Ch 12-26
In chapter 24 Aristotle outlines nine fallacious lines of argument. His second fallacy peaked my interest in regard to the way he characterized the young and old in generalities (in chapters 12-14), something that initially seems to coincide with the bad lines of argument he lays out. Is he talking out of both sides of his mouth?
He spoke of the age groups in a simplified manner, giving attributes to a wide group of individuals, where many exceptions could be imagined to his paradigm. He says: "young men have strong passions, and tend to gratify them indiscriminately...it is the sexual [bodily desires] by which they are most swayed...[t]hey are changable and fickle in their desires, which are violent while they last but quickly over...[t]hey are hot-tempered and quick-tempered and apt to give way to their anger..." and on and on (bkIIch12). These are sweeping statements about the young that clearly not everyone fits into - were their no mild mannered young men in Athens? And remember "young" was in the 20's and 30's age range. This I find hard to believe.
He characterizes the old in the same simplistic way, and I will not bother you with the citation for it is much similar to the above one for my purpose. To the men in the prime of life he attributes all the desirable traits - discriminating decision making, confidence but not arrogance, etc.
Now, turning to his discussion of fallacious arguments, he says: "There may be syllogism that look genuine but are not" (bkIIch24). One of these such lines "is to assert of the whole that is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole. A whole and its parts are supposed to be identical, though often they are not. You have to therefore adopt whichever of these two lines better suits your purpose" (bkIIch24). Does this (seemingly paradoxical fallacy) not clash with his own discussion of the traits of age brackets?
He seems to have asserted onto the whole, what is true of some of the parts, since there are youths who are both slow and quick to anger, elderly who are both cynical and optimistic and men in the prime of their lives who are live outside of the moderation of virtue. So is his discussion a fallacious one? I don't think so. The crux appears where he writes "you have to therefore adopt whichever of these lines better [suit] your purpose". I think he is operating under the assumption that he could not possibly characterize every class, emotion, age group, etc. to the T, and instead is listing a general stereotype that would be useful for knowing the majority of an audience. Sure there are exceptions to just about everyone of his discussions, but if a person was appealing to a broad base group, I think he would be best suited to use Aristotle's broad base generalizations. And that was his purpose for these discussions anyway, to help the reader better understand the nature of the audience they would be appealing to.
I am not arguing for the application of stereotyping by everyone everywhere, but it can be a useful tool when used for non-malicious means.
He spoke of the age groups in a simplified manner, giving attributes to a wide group of individuals, where many exceptions could be imagined to his paradigm. He says: "young men have strong passions, and tend to gratify them indiscriminately...it is the sexual [bodily desires] by which they are most swayed...[t]hey are changable and fickle in their desires, which are violent while they last but quickly over...[t]hey are hot-tempered and quick-tempered and apt to give way to their anger..." and on and on (bkIIch12). These are sweeping statements about the young that clearly not everyone fits into - were their no mild mannered young men in Athens? And remember "young" was in the 20's and 30's age range. This I find hard to believe.
He characterizes the old in the same simplistic way, and I will not bother you with the citation for it is much similar to the above one for my purpose. To the men in the prime of life he attributes all the desirable traits - discriminating decision making, confidence but not arrogance, etc.
Now, turning to his discussion of fallacious arguments, he says: "There may be syllogism that look genuine but are not" (bkIIch24). One of these such lines "is to assert of the whole that is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole. A whole and its parts are supposed to be identical, though often they are not. You have to therefore adopt whichever of these two lines better suits your purpose" (bkIIch24). Does this (seemingly paradoxical fallacy) not clash with his own discussion of the traits of age brackets?
He seems to have asserted onto the whole, what is true of some of the parts, since there are youths who are both slow and quick to anger, elderly who are both cynical and optimistic and men in the prime of their lives who are live outside of the moderation of virtue. So is his discussion a fallacious one? I don't think so. The crux appears where he writes "you have to therefore adopt whichever of these lines better [suit] your purpose". I think he is operating under the assumption that he could not possibly characterize every class, emotion, age group, etc. to the T, and instead is listing a general stereotype that would be useful for knowing the majority of an audience. Sure there are exceptions to just about everyone of his discussions, but if a person was appealing to a broad base group, I think he would be best suited to use Aristotle's broad base generalizations. And that was his purpose for these discussions anyway, to help the reader better understand the nature of the audience they would be appealing to.
I am not arguing for the application of stereotyping by everyone everywhere, but it can be a useful tool when used for non-malicious means.
Monday, January 31, 2011
Response to Aristotle's Rhetoric Book II, Ch. 1-11
The overarching purpose of these blogs still eludes me. They seem to be an informal forum to hash out ideas and practice pathetic techniques, in the hope that they become both more and less...pathetic. But then we are graded on them making them immediately formal - a sort of polished hypothesis. I probably should just read the assignment description again.
As for the purpose of this specific entry, as I began with a frustrated digression, I will track my thoughts on the give-and-take between anger and calm upon the mortal mind.
Relying heavily on pathos, as well as on ethos or logos, can ruin an argument. Aristotle makes this point early in his Rhetoric that you need the correct combination of all three principles to be the most persuasive to your audience, and to inherently, find the truth. So I feel safe in saying putting too much reliance in one, shorts the others.
Anger and calm cannot fully exist in the same mind since "...the frame of mind that makes people calm, it is plainly the opposite to that which makes them angry..." (ch 3, ln ~1380b). So just like moderating ethos, pathos and logos, a rhetor must stray from sole/heavy dependence on one emotion. He suggests this later on in the passage:
"Hence Philocrates, being asked by someone, at a time when the public was angry with him, 'Why don't you defend yourself?' did right to reply, 'The time is not yet.' 'Why when is the time?' 'When I see someone else calumniated.'" (ln ~1380b, 10)
In the illustration, the public figure Philocrates refused to defend himself since his accusers were acting out of anger alone. He chose to wait to plead his case to them once they had redirected their anger and let a bit of calm in. He did this because Philocrates knew the mind of those judging him were tainted with fresh emotion and would react rashly and unjustly to his situation (whatever that may have been). It appears that, in the Aristotelian perspective and in my mind the correct one, decisions made in the initial flooding of one's mind by an extreme emotion are rash and hasty and do not qualify for his meaning of the use of pathos as a rhetorical tool. Use emotion - by all means - but use balanced emotion.
Philocrates knew in order to get a fair assessment from his peers he needed to let the initial emotion subside and give time for the calm to swim amongst the anger and dilute it to a more reasoned level. He needed to apply kairos to their emotional level in order to be able to present his actions/argument before the public in a reasoned manner, allowing for time and his words to supply a sense of calm to the public's anger.
I guess my general thought here is that the interplay between anger and calm described in Aristotle's third chapter is a sort of loose paradigm for guiding interaction between emotion in the mind of your audience. So it follows that the ethical responsibility of a rhetor to put his/her audience in the correct emotional state (combonation of anger and calm) when presenting an argument to them in order for them to arrive at a collectively good decision.
As for the purpose of this specific entry, as I began with a frustrated digression, I will track my thoughts on the give-and-take between anger and calm upon the mortal mind.
Relying heavily on pathos, as well as on ethos or logos, can ruin an argument. Aristotle makes this point early in his Rhetoric that you need the correct combination of all three principles to be the most persuasive to your audience, and to inherently, find the truth. So I feel safe in saying putting too much reliance in one, shorts the others.
Anger and calm cannot fully exist in the same mind since "...the frame of mind that makes people calm, it is plainly the opposite to that which makes them angry..." (ch 3, ln ~1380b). So just like moderating ethos, pathos and logos, a rhetor must stray from sole/heavy dependence on one emotion. He suggests this later on in the passage:
"Hence Philocrates, being asked by someone, at a time when the public was angry with him, 'Why don't you defend yourself?' did right to reply, 'The time is not yet.' 'Why when is the time?' 'When I see someone else calumniated.'" (ln ~1380b, 10)
In the illustration, the public figure Philocrates refused to defend himself since his accusers were acting out of anger alone. He chose to wait to plead his case to them once they had redirected their anger and let a bit of calm in. He did this because Philocrates knew the mind of those judging him were tainted with fresh emotion and would react rashly and unjustly to his situation (whatever that may have been). It appears that, in the Aristotelian perspective and in my mind the correct one, decisions made in the initial flooding of one's mind by an extreme emotion are rash and hasty and do not qualify for his meaning of the use of pathos as a rhetorical tool. Use emotion - by all means - but use balanced emotion.
Philocrates knew in order to get a fair assessment from his peers he needed to let the initial emotion subside and give time for the calm to swim amongst the anger and dilute it to a more reasoned level. He needed to apply kairos to their emotional level in order to be able to present his actions/argument before the public in a reasoned manner, allowing for time and his words to supply a sense of calm to the public's anger.
I guess my general thought here is that the interplay between anger and calm described in Aristotle's third chapter is a sort of loose paradigm for guiding interaction between emotion in the mind of your audience. So it follows that the ethical responsibility of a rhetor to put his/her audience in the correct emotional state (combonation of anger and calm) when presenting an argument to them in order for them to arrive at a collectively good decision.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Enargeia
The four of us road tripped all night. We finally arrive at a ghost town watering hole jam-packed with tourists for the night. We stand close enough to see, but behind the novices, and take turns wearing out a path to the bar. Suddenly it begins. Spotlight on. They strike the first chord. Endorphins take flight and our eyes light up with the stage. We stop conversation mid-sentence and instinctively step forward. The harmonized melody inextricably wound to memorized lyrics course through our veins, amplifying the pre-drank euphoria. Verses relate moments all four of us have separately lived, uniting them to a common experience. We belt the words at all octaves and pitches, oblivious to those around, keeping rhythm by jamming a boot too harshly into the ground. One hand clutching my beer, the other one flying autonomously to the beat. Everyone around us fades into a blurry collage and are attention only acknowledges the stage and the occasional re-affirming glance at one another, nodding that it all was worth it. And the band plays on.
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